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Short Quote
But all that said, Statalist when it works as intended is free, fast,
friendly (modulo marginal grumping), clear and correct, so who’s
grumbling?
(Famous Statalist member, 7/20/2009)
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(Fun) Facts about Statalist
As of June 2009: 3,281 members
. 1,667 Statalist proper
. 1,614 Digest
May mask huge dynamics
1,080 posts on average per month over period Jan 2007 -
May 2009






Monthly averages over years 2005-2009: 947, 1,017,
1,045, 1,275, 1,277
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Economic Behavior
The economics profession can explain a fair chunk of real-world phenomena:
Workers turn up for work in the morning
Students attend university instead of working
Savers queue at a bank
Volume discounts (“Buy one - get one free”)
Three-class layout on transatlantic flights
Purchase of lottery tickets
Savers buy IPO shares
Free release of programs on ssc
Free release of advice on Statalist
. Labor supply b/c market wage exceeds reservation wage
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Workers turn up for work in the morning
Students attend university instead of working
Savers queue at a bank
Volume discounts (“Buy one - get one free”)
Three-class layout on transatlantic flights
Purchase of lottery tickets
Savers buy IPO shares
Free release of programs on ssc
Free release of advice on Statalist
. Small risk aversion / prospect of huge gains
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Crowdsourcing Example
DVD rental business promised reward of 1,000,000 $ for improvement of
algorithm
I Prediction of consumer behavior, i.e. next ﬁlm rented
I Condition: Improvement > 10%
Result:
I More than 51,000 contestants
I Two teams to beat the required threshold (10.10% vs. 10.09%)
Difference to Statalist:
I Recipient well known
I Obvious price signal
Bottom line: Still amenable to economics
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Statalist Economics
No obvious reward/price mechanism
Major cost component involved:
I Oppportunity Cost of Time




Little incentive for collusive behavior
I Problem: Duplication of effort/Coordination failure
“Supply side concentration”
I 4,819 answers overall, 515 posters of replies
I 12 suppliers give 50% of answers
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Observation Period: Jan − May 2009
515 Posters of Replies Overall
X−axis cut off at 100
# of replies on Statalist
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Existing Research
Jokisch (2006)
I PhD thesis on user involvement in production processes
Lerner and Tirole (2001, 2002)
I “The Open Source Movement: Key Research Questions”
I “Some Simple Economics of Open Source”
Mayrhofer (2006)
I “Motives and Perception of Fairness in Commercial User
Communities”
I Survey of community of ado-ﬁle contributors
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Findings in Mayrhofer (2006)
Concerned ado-ﬁle / ssc Community
Answer to Question:
“Why did you publish your last ado-ﬁle?”
I Note: Motivation for writing the ﬁle may differ
Most popular answers (Mayrhofer, 2006, pp. 11-12):
I Altruism ( 30% in strong agreement)
I Reciprocity ( 20% in strong agreement)
I Reputation ( 10% in strong agreement)
I Signalling (to community / StataCorp):
I ( 5% in strong agreement)
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Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 14 / 21Economic Behavior
Conditions for Crowdsourcing
Type of Process amenable to crowdsourcing:
I Electronic exchange must be sufﬁcient to attain goal
I No special sequence of steps needed
I “anarchistic process of open source production” (Lerner and Tirole,
2001, 821)
No physical input required
I Hard to build a plane via email
Margin for error must be – relatively – wide
I Legal implications hard to establish in crowdsourcing
I No medical treatment via crowdsourcing
Should require a lot of customization
I Search of archive renders most posts redundant
I Remaining body of posts is - hopefully - “new” in some important
aspect






Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 15 / 21Statalist Output










Number of Posts between January and May 2009
# of Posts by Day of Week
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 16 / 21Statalist Output














18 50 100 200 300 400 500
Duration of Thread in Hours
xline highlights
75th percentile
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 17 / 21Statalist Output



















6 10 20 30 40 46
Number of Posts in Thread
xline highlights 75th percentile
Kernel density estimate
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 18 / 21Statalist Output
Statalist Output under the Microscope IV: Orphans
January February March April May Total
no orphan 97.96% 99.06% 98.96% 99.25% 99.03% 98.86%
orphan 2.04% 0.94% 1.04% 0.75% 0.97% 1.14%
Orphan status is assigned to
I threads with no replies
I which are not: Announcements of
I Stata Net Courses
I Developments at SSC
i.e. posts that were intended to attract a reply but failed to do so
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 19 / 21Statalist Output
Statalist Output under the Microscope IV: Orphans
January February March April May Total
no orphan 97.96% 99.06% 98.96% 99.25% 99.03% 98.86%
orphan 2.04% 0.94% 1.04% 0.75% 0.97% 1.14%
Orphan status is assigned to
I threads with no replies
I which are not: Announcements of
I Stata Net Courses
I Developments at SSC
i.e. posts that were intended to attract a reply but failed to do so
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 19 / 21Statalist Output
Statalist Output under the Microscope IV: Orphans
January February March April May Total
no orphan 97.96% 99.06% 98.96% 99.25% 99.03% 98.86%
orphan 2.04% 0.94% 1.04% 0.75% 0.97% 1.14%
Orphan status is assigned to
I threads with no replies
I which are not: Announcements of
I Stata Net Courses
I Developments at SSC
i.e. posts that were intended to attract a reply but failed to do so
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 19 / 21Statalist Output
Statalist Output under the Microscope IV: Orphans
January February March April May Total
no orphan 97.96% 99.06% 98.96% 99.25% 99.03% 98.86%
orphan 2.04% 0.94% 1.04% 0.75% 0.97% 1.14%
Orphan status is assigned to
I threads with no replies
I which are not: Announcements of
I Stata Net Courses
I Developments at SSC
i.e. posts that were intended to attract a reply but failed to do so
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 19 / 21Statalist Output
Statalist Output under the Microscope IV: Orphans
January February March April May Total
no orphan 97.96% 99.06% 98.96% 99.25% 99.03% 98.86%
orphan 2.04% 0.94% 1.04% 0.75% 0.97% 1.14%
Orphan status is assigned to
I threads with no replies
I which are not: Announcements of
I Stata Net Courses
I Developments at SSC
i.e. posts that were intended to attract a reply but failed to do so
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 19 / 21Statalist Output
Statalist Output under the Microscope IV: Orphans
January February March April May Total
no orphan 97.96% 99.06% 98.96% 99.25% 99.03% 98.86%
orphan 2.04% 0.94% 1.04% 0.75% 0.97% 1.14%
Orphan status is assigned to
I threads with no replies
I which are not: Announcements of
I Stata Net Courses
I Developments at SSC
i.e. posts that were intended to attract a reply but failed to do so
Martin Weiss (University of Tuebingen) Economics of Statalist Exchanges Washington, DC, 2009 19 / 21Statalist Output
Thank you for your attention!
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